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I. WHAT IS A "SECURITY"?
[A]n investment contract for purposes of -the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in
a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party. .... I
In the twenty-five years following that statement by the Supreme
Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,2 the test announced adequately pro-
tected the investing public and, with few exceptions, endured without
major revision. The last three years, however, have brought an on-
slaught of criticism from courts and legal commentators, and the result
has been a steady, but now accelerating, erosion of the 1946 definition.
The four elements of that definition, (1) investment of money, in a
(2) common enterprise, with the (3) expectation of profit, (4) solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, have. been subjected
to such judicial expansion that they no longer furnish a reliable guide
for courts faced with the problem of distinguishing between similar
transactions to determine which are within the ambit of the federal se-
curities laws. At the same time, however, the courts have been
reluctant to depart from the words of the Supreme Court.
This reluctance to examine new formulations after Howey has pre-
vented the development of an analysis based on the functional realities
and policy implications presented by a particular transaction.' These
1. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
2. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
3. Judicial adherence to the Howey language in defining both "security," see text
accompanying note 17 infra, and "investment contract" is ironic in light of the Court's
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* realities can be discerned from one central question: Does the investor
in the transaction need the special protections of the securities acts?4
This question can be divided into two seperate questions: (1) Are
the enforcement and regulatory mechanisms of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) designed to control the abuses associated
with the transaction? and (2) Even if the SEC is capable of exercising
control, should that function be assigned to other enforcement and reg-
ulatory mechanisms? 5 Before examining what part these functional
admonition that the definition "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those
who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits." 328 U.S. at 299.
4. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaning-
ful Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 367, 373 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Coffey]. For
an analysis of the Coffey approach, see notes 31-38 infra and accompanying text.
5. This kind of analysis has been present at the SEC for the past few years. See,
e.g., Sommer, Introduction, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 213, 214 (1974):
Someone has suggested that, instead of stretching the meaning of "security"
in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to meet
the new creations of promoters, perhaps Congress should create a new agency
which would have regulatory and enforcement authority over "dirty tricks" re-
gardless of the form they take. This agency would field those inflictions upon
the public which somehow or other fall outside the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission, the SEC and such other agencies as have concerns with
protecting the individuals of the nation against being put upon. Thus it would
not be necessary to engage in intricate reasoning to find that a pyramid scheme
or a membership in a country club was a security, thus sharing a concept with
common stocks and bonds.
While, as Commissioner Sommer suggests, this approach toward intricate promotion
schemes may be novel, it is precisely the kind of analysis that the SEC and the Su-
preme Court have used in decisions on annuity plans and insurance regulation. In SEC
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959), in which the Court
held that variable annuities were subject to regulation under the federal securities acts,
Justice Douglas expressed the Court's concern with the appropriateness of federal in-
volvement:
We start with a reluctance to disturb the state regulatory schemes that are
in actual effect, either by displacing them or by superimposing federal require-
ments on transactions that are tailored to meet state requirements. When the
States speak in the field of "insurance," they speak with the authority of a long
tradition. For the regulation of "insurance," though within the ambit of fed-
eral power . . . . has traditionally been under the control of the States.
Id. at 68-69. See also Dorsey, The Place of "Variable Annuities" in Law and Econo-
mics, 34 NOTRE DAmm LAW. 489 (1959); Mearns, The Commission, the Variable Annu-
ity, and the Inconsiderate Sovereign, 45 VA. L. Ray. 831 (1959); 20 OHio ST. L.J. 688
(1959); 38 TEXAS L. Rlv. 248 (1959). The SEC has since attempted to define the ex-
act parameters of its jurisdiction. In November 1971, two insurance associations peti-
tioned the SEC for an exemption from registration under § 6 of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6 (1970). In January 1973, the SEC replied that
while variable annuities are "securities," companies offering them did not have to regis-
ter under the Act. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5360 (Jan. 31, 1973). In a
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questions have played in the recent attenuation of Howey, it is
necessary to discuss in detail the analysis employed by the Supreme
Court and the critical comment it engendered.
A. The Supreme Court Decisions
Three years before Howey, the Court was presented in SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp.6 with its first opportunity to define the scope
of the term "security"7 as used in the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Act)." An oil promoter had formed a corporation and acquired oil
and gas leaseholds in Texas. In order to finance the drilling of a
test well, he sold assignments of the leasehold to investors all over
the country. No parcel assigned was larger than twenty acres. The
literature given the investors emphasized that they would realize a profit
if the promoter were successful with his test well. The Court held
that the scheme involved a security. Justice Jackson, writing for the
majority, rejected the promoter's contention that he was selling only a
naked leasehold right, and instead emphasized the "enterprise" aspect
of the transaction:
later release, however, the SEC took the position that any variable annuities registered
under § 6(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1933 Act], must receive approval from the appropriate state insurance commissioner
prior to registration. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5413 (Aug. 2, 1973). Thus,
the SEC has also recognized the effect on its jurisdiction of other possible means of reg-
ulation, and their capabilities in the field. See generally Blank, Keen, Payne & Miller,
Variable Life Insurance and the Federal Securities Laws, 60 VA. L. REv. 71 (1974),
6. 320 U.S. 344 (1943), noted in 17 S. CAL. L. REv. 324 (1944).
7. All the acts relating to the regulatory functions of the SEC contain similar defi-
nitions of the term "security." See 1933 Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970); Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1934 Act]; Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(36), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(36)
(1970); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18)
(1970). For the purposes of the analysis in this Note, the definitions contained in the
1933 and 1934 Acts will be treated as equivalent. The 1934 Act definition is:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, pre-
organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has
a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
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The drilling of this well was not an unconnected or uncontrolled phe-
nomenon to which salesmen pointed merely to show the possibilities of
the offered leases. The exploration enterprise was woven into these
leaseholds in both an economic and a legal sense; the undertaking to
drill a well runs through the whole transaction as the thread on which
everybody's beads were strung.9
The Court also rejected the lower courts' reliance on the real property
character of the documents on the ground that the policy of the securi-
ties acts clearly indicated that the leases should be included within its
regulatory scope. 10 The Court asserted that no specific test was neces-
sary; courts should decide issues by a case-by-case method:
In applying acts of this general purpose, the courts have not been guided
by the nature of the assets back of a particular document or offering.
The test rather is what character the instrument is given in commerce
by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic in-
ducements held out to the prospect. In the enforcement of an act such
as -this it is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as being
what they were represented to be."
Thus, in its first attempt to define the term "security," the Court
emphasized the functional and policy aspects of the transaction,
namely, whether the plan of distribution presented the abuses that the
securities acts were designed to correct.
The Court's second opportunity to address the question of the defini-
tion of "security" produced the now-famous Howey formulation. W.J.
Howey Company owned large tracts of citrus acreage in Florida,
managed by the commonly held Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc.
Customers were offered small amounts of citrus acreage accompanied
by an option to purchase service contracts with Howey-in-the-Hills.
The Court held that the transfer of acreage, represented by a land
sales contract and warranty deed, with the service contract constituted
an "investment contract," and thus fell within section 2(1) of the 1933
Act. Justice Murphy, writing for the majority, again rejected the
defense that only sales of property were involved. Noting that the in-
9. 320 U.S. at 348.
10. Id. at 349:
It is clear that an economic interest in this well-drilling undertaking was
what brought into being the instruments that defendants were selling and gave
to the instruments most of their value and all of their lure. The trading in
these documents had all the evils inherent in the securities transactions which
it was the aim of the Securities Act to end.
11. Id. at 352-53 (footnote omitted).
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vestors were predominantly business and professional people who were
not interested in managing the acreage, the Court concluded that this
was a scheme for "the placing of capital or laying out of money in a
way intended to secure income or profit from its employment."12
Then, after surveying previous state blue sky decisions, the Court
adopted the four-step investment contract definition. 13
Two characteristics of the Howey opinion should be emphasized.
First, the Court, as it had done three years previously in Joiner, relied
heavily on the policy implications of the transaction. After announcing
its definition, the Court said:
[The definition] permits the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of com-
pelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of "the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary con-
cept of a security." H. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11. It
embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable
of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of prof-
its. 14
Moreover, the functional reality of the situation was that the "pur-
chasers" lacked both the desire and expertise to develop the land; they
were "attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their invest-
ment."' 5  Indeed, individual development of the plots was not "eco-
nomically feasible" due to their small size.' 6
The second aspect of the Howey decision that has been overlooked
by both supporters and critics of the four-step definition is that the
Court was attempting to define the term "investment contract," and not
the generic term "security." Certainly, the Court would consider an
employee stock-option plan a "security," even though such a plan
would not fit into the rigid "profit solely from the efforts of another"
12. 328 U.S. at 298, quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52,
56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920).
13. See text accompanying note 1 supra. One commentator has analyzed the state
decisions relied on by the Court, 328 U.S. at 298 n.4, and concluded that none contain
the Howey definition and, moreover, that they are very contradictory. See Long, An
Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation,
24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 177 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Long]. See also 30 MicH.
L. REV. 1113 (1932).
14. 328 U.S. at 299. This legislative purpose is again emphasized in the opinion's
concluding sentence: "The statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors
is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." Id. at 301.
15. Id. at 300.
16. Id.
Vol. 1974:815] 819
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portion of the Howey "investment contract" definition. Thus, those
courts and commentators who consider Howey to be the Supreme
Court's fundamental analysis of what constitutes a security are mis-
reading the Court's intention. 17
There has been one other major Supreme Court attempt to define
the contours of the federal securities jurisdiction. In Tcherepnin v.
Knight's holders of withdrawable capital shares in an Illinois savings
and loan association brought a class action for rescission based on fraud.
The shares entitled their holders to a dividend based on the associa-
tion's profits. Thus, the holders "participated" in a plan whose success
depended on the skill of the association's management in making prof-
itable loans. The Court held the shares to be securities, "most closely
resembl[ing] investment contracts,"' 9 and based its decision squarely
on policy considerations:
[We are guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction that
remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its pur-
poses. The Securities Exchange Act quite clearly falls into the category
of remedial legislation. One of its central purposes is to protect inves-
tors through the requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securities
... . [rIn searching for the meaning and scope of the word "secu-
rity" in -the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and the em-
phasis should be on economic reality.2 0
Although the savings and loan association was regulated by the state
of Illinois, the Court, quoting a dissenting opinion of the court of
appeals, concluded that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act) 2' was a better vehicle for protecting the investors' interests:
17. Other attempts have been made to limit the effect of the Howey language. For
instance, it has been suggested that the Court was trying to produce the most narrow
holding to cover the facts in Howey. See Comment, What is a Security? Howey,
Turner Enterprises, and Franchise Agreements, 22 KAN. L. REv. 55, 59 (1973).
There is some merit to this proposition, since the state decision most relied on by the
Court, State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920), in-
volved a scheme in which the investor was required to expend some effort to produce
a profit.
18. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
19. Id. at 338. Withdrawable capital shares constituted one of the two ways Illinois
banks were allowed to raise capital. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 761(a) (Smith-Hurd
1970). Each holder of a share was a member of the association and entitled to one vote
per $100 invested, id. §§ 741(a)(2), 742(d)(4), and to receive the dividends, id. §
778(c).
20. 389 U.S. at 336 (footnote omitted).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1970).
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"The investors . . . were less able to protect themselves than the pur-
chasers of orange groves in Howey. . . . Because savings and loan as-
sociations are constantly seeking investors through advertising . . . the
SEC's present tender of its expert services should be especially beneficial
to would-be savings and loan investors as a shield against unscrupulous
or unqualified promoters. '22
B. The Criticisms of Howey
Justice Murphy's four-pronged test for "investment contracts" ade-
quately explains most of the decisions involving sales-management con-
tracts." In 1961, however, the California Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Traynor, rejected the Howey formulation and proposed a
new definition of "security" in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski.24
The promoters had contracted to purchase a 22-acre ranch for $75,000.
Only $400 was put down; the rest of the purchase price was to
come from the sale of memberships in a country club to be con-
structed on the ranch. The California Corporations Commission
demanded that the offer of memberships be registered under the state's
blue sky law; the promoters maintained that they were merely sell-
ing the right to use the club's facilities. The court held that the
memberships were "securities,"25 although members were not to par-
22. 389 U.S. at 345-46, quoting 371 F.2d 374, 384-85 (7th Cir. 1966) (Cummings,
J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974)
(chinchillas); Ahrens v. American-Canadian Beaver Co., 428 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1970)
(beavers); Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967) (beavers);
Blackwell v. Bentson, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953) (citrus groves); Ascher v. United
States, 143 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1944) (vending machines); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143
F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944) (bottling contracts); Schiliner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co.,
134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943) (distillery stock certificates); Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234
F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (archery range); SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F.
Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962) (citrus groves); SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y.
1940) (foxes); SEC v. Gilbert, 29 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Okla. 1939) (motor boats);
Hollywood State Bank v. Wilde, 70 Cal. App. 2d 103, 160 P.2d 846 (1945) (chinchillas;
state statute); State v. Lorentz, 221 Minn. 366, 22 N.W.2d 313 (1946) (cemetery lots);
State v. Robbins, 185 Minn. 202, 240 N.W. 456 (1932) (muskrats; state statute);
Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193 (Ch. 1932) (rabbits;
state statute). See generally Annot., 3 A.L.R. FED. 592 (1970).
24. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
25. Ch. 384, § 1, [19491 Cal. Laws 699, as amended, CAL. Coin'. CODE § 25019
(Deering Supp. 1974) contains a definition of "security" that is identical to the 1933
Act definition in all material respects. Throughout the remainder of this Note, state
court decisions should be assumed to have been based upon statutory language similar
to the federal acts unless otherwise indicated.Washington University Open Scholarship
822 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:815
ticipate in the club's profits: "We have here nothing like the ordinary
sale of a right to use existing facilities. [The promoters] are soliciting
the risk capital with which to develop a business for profit."2 Although
some language in the opinion suggested that the blue sky policy of "fair,
just, and equitable" regulation was a factor in the decision,17 the court's
reasoning was based primarily on the functional similarity of solicitation
of capital for new ventures, whether through an offering of stock or
club "memberships."
The approach of the Silver Hills court has been designated the "risk-
capital" theory. Although the theory is not without its problems and
critics,28 its importance lies not in its utility as a formula but in its role
as the first major attempt to avoid the mechanical use of the Howey
test and employ an analysis grounded in an emphasis on the economic
26. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
27. Ch. 384, § 1, [19491 Cal. Laws 709, as amended, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140
(Deering Supp. 1974). The paternalistic blue sky standard permits greater intervention
by state authorities to prevent the registration of securities that are found not to be
in the public interest. See UNIFORM SECuRmEs Acr § 306. See generally L. Loss &
E. CowETr, BLu E SKY LAW 327-30 (1958); Edwards, California Measures the Uniform
Securities Act Against Its Corporate Securities Law, 15 Bus. LAw. 814 (1960). The
Silver Hills court noted that the California definition contained language indicating that
"any note, any evidence of indebtedness whether interest-bearing or not," Ch. 384, § 1,
[1949] Cal. Laws 699, as amended, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (Deering Supp. 1974),
was a security and thus discounted the "profit" requirement. It then said:
Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what
is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford those
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legit-
imate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form
or another.
55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. Despite the repeal of
this statutory provision, the California Corporations Commission still uses the Silver
Hills definition. See Long, Introduction, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 96, 118 & n.102 (1974).
28. The major problem with the risk-capital theory of Silver Hills is that the court
never adequately defined what it meant by "risk-capital." It could mean (1) capital
used to promote a previously nonexistent project, (2) capital invested in a risky chance
or venture, or (3) capital with a very risky chance of return. See Note, Franchise Reg-
ulation Under the California Corporate Securities Law, 5 SAN DIErO L. REv. 140 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as California Franchise Regulation]. See also Note, Franchisor Lia-
bility Under Securities Law, 13 WASHBURN L.J. 68 (1974).
Risk-capital has been criticized as being too subjective a concept. Some commentators
have suggested that acceptance of this theory would necessitate a day-by-day evaluation
of an enterprise to determine whether enough risk existed to classify the investment as
a security. See California Franchise Regulation 155; 24 VAND. L. REv. 638 (1971).
Other criticisms are that the theory's emphasis on risky ventures would seriously impede
the necessary flow of capital to innovative enterprises, and that abuses can occur in the
most solidly established corporations. See generally California Franchise Regulation.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/1
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and policy realities behind the transaction. As Justice Traynor stated,
[A]s a general rule, the sale of "securities" that is condemned by the
courts involves an attempt by an issuer to raise funds for a business ven-
ture or enterprise; an indiscriminate offering to the public at large where
the persons solicited are selected at random; a passive position on the
part of an investor; and the conduct of the enterprise by the issuer with
other people's money.2 9
Six years after Silver Hills, Professor Coffey published the first
rigorous attempt to analyze the economic realities of a "security."
Coffey initiated his inquiry by addressing a "master policy question,"
namely, "What characteristics or features of a transaction necessitate
its being subject to the rather specialized anti-fraud protection afforded
by the securities laws?" His answer was the formulation of a five-part
test:
30
A "security" is:
(1) A transaction in which
(2) a person ("buyer") furnishes value ("initial value") to
another ("seller"); and
(3) a portion of initial value is subjected to the risks of an enter-
prise, it being sufficient if-
(a) part of initial value is furnished for a proprietary in-
terest in, or debt-holder claim against, the enterprise, or
(b) any property received by the buyer is committed to use
by the enterprise, even though the buyer retains specific
ownership of such property, or
(c) part of initial value is furnished for property whose pre-
sent value is determined by taking into account the antic-
ipated but unrealized success of the enterprise, even
though the buyer has no legal relationship with the en-
terprise; and
(4) at the time of the transaction, the buyer is not familiar with
the operations of the enterprise or does not receive the right
to participate in the management of the enterprise; and
(5) the furnishing of initial value is induced by the seller's prom-
ises or representations which give rise to a reasonable under-
29. 55 Cal. 2d at 814, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188, citing Dahlquist, Reg-
ulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act, 33 CALIF. L.
REv. 343, 360 (1945).
30. Coffey 377 (footnote omitted).
Vol. 1974:815]
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standing that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above
initial value, will accrue to the buyer as a result of the opera-
tion of the enterprise.
The first two elements follow the Howey definition, except that
Coffey indicates that the initial investment can consist of value other
than money.' The heart of Coffey's analysis, that "risk to initial in-
vestment . . . is the single most important economic characteristic
which distinguishes a security from the universe of other transac-
tions,' ' 2 is expanded in item (3) of the test. The first sub-item, (3)(a),
covers the situation in which the risk of return on the initial investment
is entirely dependent upon the success of the enterprise-that is, an
unsecured interest.3 The second situation, explained in (3)(b),
covers the traditional sales-management cases; for example, when an
animal is sold to the investor and recommitted to the promoter for train-
ing or breeding. 34 The final section, (3)(c), has become the most im-
portant in recent judicial attempts to characterize transactions as
"securities." Basically, this section covers referral-sales schemes
in which property is sold to the investor with an overcharge. The over-
charge becomes subject to the risks of the enterprise, since it enables
the buyer to receive payments dependent on the future success of the
enterprise. 35
To this point, Coffey's analysis is similar to Justice Traynor's opinion
in Silver Hills, which also emphasized the functional similarity of all
securities offerings-that is, a promoter soliciting value with the risk of
loss on the investor.36 Coffey carries the policy argument one step fur-
31. There seems to be little analytical justification for reading Justice Murphy's
opinion in Howey to require money for the initial investment. It is true, as some com-
mentators have pointed out, that most promoters are more interested in money than in
labor or property. See Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Realtliy and
Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HAsnNus L. 219 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Hannan & Thomas]; Long 161-62.
32. Coffey 375.
33. Coffey cites Joiner to support this proposition. Id. at 381-82. While it is true
that the investors in Joiner purchased a property right, its value was entirely dependent
on the success of the test well. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
34. See, e.g., Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967).
35. See Coffey 394-95.
36. There is also some support for this concept in the Supreme Court insurance deci-
sions. See note 5 supra. Justice Douglas analyzed the variable annuity presented in
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959), in terms of
risk allocation:
The difficulty is that, absent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable
annuity places all the investment risks on the annuitant, none on the company.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/1
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ther, however, by stressing the requirement in item (4) that the buyer
be unsophisticated or denied participation in the management of the
enterprise. In other words, there are certain factors, such as investor
participation or sophistication, that take the instrument out of the
ambit of the securities acts by reducing the possibility of fraud in the
transaction.37
The fifth item in Coffey's analysis attempts to correct the Howey reli-
ance on expectation of pecuniary return. Coffey's contention is that,
as in Silver Hills, the return on the investment may be tax benefits or
rights to use facilities. Moreover, as the risk to the initial value in-
creases, the 1933 Act policy of protection of investors requires less ex-
pectation of return."'
The Coffey analysis has been approved by commentators39 and at
least one court."0 It offers the most thorough analysis of the elements
The holder gets only a pro rata share of what the portfolio of equity interest
reflects--which may be a lot, a little, or nothing . . . . [IThe concept of
"insurance" involves some investment risk-taking on the part of the company.
Id. at 71. Similarly, in SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967), the
decision turned on whether a variable annuity which was 50% fixed return and 50%
dependent on investment success constituted a "security." Justice Harlan, writing for
the majority, held that a substantial risk remained with the investor, and thus a "secu-
rity" was involved. Id. at 211. See also Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224
(9th Cir. 1974), where the court held that the risk-of-loss factor distinguished a com-
mercial loan from a security. See generally Hannan & Thomas 241-42; notes 237-42
Infra and accompanying text.
37. Coffey is able to cite Howey for support of this position, since Justice Murphy
repeatedly stressed the lack of expertise and experience of the Howey investors. See
text accompanying note 15 supra. For a fuller discussion of this requirement, see note
126 infra and accompanying text.
38. Coffey cites an SEC opinion to the effect that trading stamps, meal tickets, sub-
way tokens, and box tops are not securities since there is no expectation of "profit."
The release goes on to state, however, that these items may be considered "securities"
if "they are used as a method of corporate financing." SEC Securities Act Release No.
3890 (Jan. 21, 1958). See also Hannan & Thomas 247-48. One commentator has sug-
gested that this distinction, while it may be correct, is not capable of judicial use. See
California Franchise Regulation 148-51.
39. See generally Hannan & Thomas; Long.
40. See State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
The case was a securities prosecution against a founders contract scheme. See text ac-
companying note 41 infra. The court, in rejecting Howey and adopting the Coffey anal-
yzis, said:
Thus courts become entrapped in polemics over the meaning of the word
"solely" and fail to consider the more fundamental question whether the stat-
utory policy of affording broad protection to investors should be applied even
to those situations where an investor is not inactive, but participates to a lim-
ited degree in the operation of the business.
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of the functional question posed earlier in this discussion, namely,
whether the enforcement and regulatory mechanisms of the SEC are
designed to control the abuses associated with the transaction. Coffey's
analysis highlights those elements that call for the extensive disclosure
and antifraud remedies of the securities acts.
The remainder of this discussion will examine the demise of the
Howey test in four separate areas and the failure of the courts to recog-
nize the functional and policy realities that can serve as effective guides
in those areas. The Coffey analysis will be used to answer the first
question derived from the central policy question; the second question,
whether the SEC should be assigned the task of regulating the transac-
tion, will be examined by reference to other attempts at regulation. Fi-
nally, an analysis will be made of one area in which courts, freed from
the restraints of a Howey-type definition, have been more successful
in developing a meaningful approach based upon the policy realities of
the transaction.
C. Judicial Application of the Howey Test
1. Multilevel Distributorships: The "Solely" Requirement
One man is perhaps most responsible for the recent intense judicial
and scholarly attention to the meaning of the term "security." The
man is Glenn W. Turner, and his contribution consisted of one of the
largest frauds of the past decade, the "multilevel distributorship." The
scheme presented a direct challenge to both state and federal regula-
tory authorities, and their responses have changed the shape of the law.
There are two principal types of multilevel distributorship schemes.
The first, Turner's "pyramid" scheme, consists of selling a product or
service through a multilevel network of independent distributors. The
purchase of a distributorship entitles the investor to recruit other
investors and earn a finder's fee for each new participant. Obviously,
it becomes much more profitable to recruit investors than to sell the
product. The recruits are enticed by promises of easy wealth delivered
in high-pressure recruiting sessions which closely resemble revival
meetings. The second type of scheme, the founders contract, evolves
from the same principle. The originator recruits investors by sell-
ing cards to be used at a store that he will build. The purchaser
52 Hawaii at 647, 485 P.2d at 108 (footnote omitted). See also 18 WAYNE L. REV.
1141 (1972).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/1
Vol. 1974:8151 SECURITIES REGULATION
of the cards also buys the right to sell other people the cards and to
earn direct and override commission fees for every card sold. Most
of the time, no store is ever built.
The major abuse associated with these schemes is obvious. Just as in
a chain-letter, the investors who come in late find that the market is
already saturated.". Moreover, the prime targets for these schemes are
the poor and uneducated who are coerced into parting with their sav-
ings by the high-pressure tactics of the successful salesman.4 2  By the
time most of these people realize that there is no market for their prod-
ucts, the promoters have departed, leaving behind only an under-cap-
italized corporate shell.4
Although these organizations are not new, 44 it was not until the mid-
1960's that they became a serious consumer-fraud problem. 5 Largely
due to the success of Turner and his various organizations,46 by the
end of 1972 there were 150 different pyramid operations in ex-
41. A predecessor to Turner, Holiday Magic Distributors, promised its investors that
they would make a profit if they could get five new investors each month. At first
glance, this does not seem difficult, but the SEC has calculated that if each investor ac-
complished it, there would be 305,175,780 people selling at the end of one year. See
SEC v. Holiday Magic Distrib., BNA SEc. REr. & L. RnsP. No. 211, at A-5 (N.D. Cal.
July 18, 1973) (complaint of SEC). See also TIms, July 16, 1973, at 51; N.Y. Times,
Apr. 3, 1973, at 45, col. I (late city ed.). Congress has specifically attempted to protect
the investing public from chain-letter schemes through the Mail Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1970).
42. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 478-80 (9th Cir.
1973).
43. See Hearings on the Role of Small Business in Franchising Before the Subcomm.
on Minority Small Business Enterprises and Franchising of the House Permanent Select
Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1973) (testimony of Neal McCoy,
Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC):
The New York state attorney general has in the past indicated that only 79
out of 1,600 distributors in Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. [a Turner pyramid]
made more than $5,000 through sales of Koscot in 1970. Only 10 made an
excess of $20,000. We have also been told that in Pennsylvania, during a 5-
month period ending February, 1972, of 845 people enrolled in Dare-To-Be-
Great [another Turner pyramid], only 72 recouped more than their investment
and 656 failed to get any return whatsoever.
See also Comment, supra note 17.
44. For an early case involving pyramid operations, see Twentieth Century Co. v.
Quilling, 130 Wis. 318, 110 N.W. 174 (1907). See also United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d
607 (7th Cir. 1964) (mail fraud conviction).
45. As early as 1966, the Better Business Bureau ranked pyramid schemes third on
its list of the ten most serious consumer frauds. See 51 TEXAs L. REv. 788, 803 (1973).
46. Turner had two principal plans. First, he sold "motivational courses" through
Dare To Be Great, Inc. Second, he sold cosmetics through Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.
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istence with a combined investment of over $300 million.47  Fi-
nally, state attorneys general began to look for a way to stop the
multi-million dollar chain-letter that Turner was heading.48 Although
other remedies were tried,49 most states turned to the securities laws.
The result was that about one-half of the states found on various
grounds that the Turner plan involved a "security","0 while the other
half rejected the securities claim on the basis of the Howey definition."1
There was no difficulty with Howey's first three elements, invest-
ment in a common enterprise with the expectation of profit. The prob-
lem arose with the fourth element, "solely from the efforts of another,"
since the investor was required to solicit more purchasers if he was to
make a profit. Most of the Howey-influenced courts recognized that
some government control over these schemes was necessary, but felt
bound by the Supreme Court definition.
Thus, there was a sharp split in the states when the federal courts were
first presented with the question under the 1934 Act. The District
Court of Oregon, however, in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
47. See Comment, supra note 17.
48. Turner attempted a counter-attack by suing twenty-six state attorneys 'general,
charging a massive conspiracy to violate his civil rights. The action was dismissed in
Turner v. Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963 (D. Vt. 1972), appeal dismissed, Civil No. 73-1272
(2d Cir., June 5, 1973).
49. See notes 78-90 infra and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Hurst v. Dare To Be Great, Inc., 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973) (inter-
preting Oregon law and risk-capital); Frye v. Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. App. 1972)
(profit-sharing element used); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485
P.2d 105 (1971) (using Coffey formula); State ex rel. Park v. Glenn Turner Enter-
prises, Inc., CCH BLUE SKY L. R P. f 71,023 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Mar. 29, 1972) (adopt-
ing risk-capital); Mahoney v. Andresen, CCH BLUE SKY L. RPP. 71,093 (Kings
County, N.Y., Civ. Ct., Jan. 3, 1973) (adopting risk-capital); State ex rel. Fisher v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,059 (Okla. Dist. Ct.,
Jan. 10, 1973) (adopting risk-capital); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys.,
Inc., 482 P.2d 549 (Ore. App. 1971) (adopting risk-capital).
51. See, e.g., Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841
(1968); Georgia Mkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969),
noted in 21 MERCER L. REV. 715 (1970); Brown v. Computer Credit Sys., Inc., 128 Ga.
App. 429, 197 S.E.2d 165 (1973); Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford, 177 So. 2d 635 (La.
App. 1965); Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 30 Ohio Op. 2d 226, 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ct.
App. 1964); Commonwealth v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199
A.2d 428 (1964); Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Koscot In-
terplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See generally Note,
Pyramid Scheme Regulation: The Evolution of Investment Contracts as a Security
Under the Federal Securities Law, 25 SYR. L. Rav. 690 (1974).
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Inc.,"2 had no difficulty in deciding that the pyramid sales scheme fit
into three categories of "security." 3  Instead of following the "solely"
test, the court substituted a new formula based on whether the investor
"has substantial power to affect the success of the enterprise." '' More-
over, if the success of the venture requires professional or managerial
skill, the investor must possess enough sophistication to be able to sup-
ply those skills, and not be forced to turn to others for them.5"
The decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,56 which, although it
also held that an "investment contract" was involved, modified the
lower court's test for "solely": "[The test is] whether the efforts made
by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones,
those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of
the enterprise. '5 7
There are two important characteristics of the Turner case beyond
its modification of Howey's fourth element. First, the Ninth Circuit
implicitly recognized a distinction advanced by some commentators5
that becomes an important factor in the area of franchising.59 Besides
finding that the investors' efforts in Turner were not "essential" enough
to negative the existence of a security, the court characterized them
as part of the "initial" investment required to capitalize the operation
at the outset. Secondly, both Turner courts returned to the original
policy analysis of the Joiner Court. The district court emphasized that
the promoters had represented their scheme as an investment to the
objects of their sales efforts.60 And the circuit court rested its decision
squarely on the policy discussions of the Supreme Court:
52. 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
53. The court held that the pyramid scheme was "commonly known as a security,"
relying on state court decisions finding Dare To Be Great, Inc., to be a security. Id.
at 772. It ignored the contrary results. The court without elaboration also found that
the plan involved a "certificate of interest in a profit-sharing agreement." For a more
complete discussion of these contentions, see note 63 infra.
54. 348 F. Supp. at 775.
55. Id. This portion of the opinion closely resembles the discussion of the Howey
unsophisticated investor. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
56. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973). Because it found the scheme to be within the
"investment contract" definition of the 1933 Act, the appellate court found it unneces-
sary to review the district court's alternative grounds for finding a "security." See note
53 supra.
57. 474 F.2d at 482.
58. See Goodwin, Franchising Law Matures, 28 Bus. LAw. 703 (1973); Note, Reg-
ulation of the Franchise as a Security, 19 J. PuB. L. 105 (1970).
59. See notes 104-07 infra and accompanying text.
60. 348 F. Supp. at 772.
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[ln light of the remedial nature of the legislation, the statutory policy
of affording broad protection to the public, and the Supreme Court's ad-
monitions that the definition of securities should be a flexible one, the
word "solely" should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the
definition of an investment contract, but rather must be construed realis-
tically, so as to include within the definition those schemes which involve
in substance, if not form, securities. 61
In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc."2 the Fifth Circuit adopted
the Ninth Circuit test in reversing a district court opinion based
primarily on the precedential force of Howey. 3  The appellate court
had no difficulty satisfying the first three elements of Howey, but
was forced to discuss the "solely" requirement more fully. The
court twice mentioned its determination to apply a "functional" ap-
proach to avoid frustrating the remedial purposes of the 1933 Act.04
Moreover, the court questioned literal adherence to the "solely"
language in view of the Howey Court's reliance on state court decisions
that did not specifically use the word "solely."05 Finally, the court
noted that the trend among the circuits was to liberalize the strict re-
liance on the language of Howey. 06
Although the courts in both Turner and Koscot undoubtedly reached
the correct result, it is unfortunate that their opinions followed the rigid
categories of Howey. The courts based their decisions primarily on the
61. 474 F.2d at 482. For detailed studies of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, see 6
CREIGHTON L. REv. 450 (1973); 52 N.C.L. Rtv. 476 (1973); 51 TExAs L. RPv. 788
(1973).
62. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
63. The district court admitted that Koscot, part of the Turner pyramid, represented
a "get-rich-quick" scheme in the worst sense, but felt compelled by stare decisis to hold
that it was not a security. 365 F. Supp. at 590. The court was more convincing in its
discussion of the "commonly known as" and "profit-sharing agreement" arguments. As
to the former, the court demanded a uniform and proper standard. Noting that the ex-
pert witness at the trial, a securities analyst, had denied that most experts would consider
the scheme to be a security, the court concluded that the industry view was not uni-
form. Also, the state courts that had considered the question had split. See sources
cited notes 50-51 supra. Similarly, no security was found under the "profit-sharing
agreement" category. The court reasoned that the money received by the investors was
"commissions" and not "profits." For a discussion of the profits/commissions distinc-
tion, see Commonwealth v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199
A.2d 428 (1964). For the Internal Revenue Service's definition of "profit-sharing," see
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401, 404, construed in Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v.
Koebler, 266 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1959). See generally 48 TuLANE L. Rnv. 738 (1974).
64. 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1974).
65. See note 5 supra.
66. 497 F.2d 473, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1974).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/1
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policy of preventing a massive fraud; it only serves to confuse the issue
to try to fit a transaction into the formalistic confines of the Howey
language. As the Fifth Circuit correctly observed, recent cases have
all but eliminated the conventional "investment contract" analysis. In-
stead of mechanical test-matching, courts should acknowledge the role
played by functional and policy realities. The pyramid scheme easily
fits within the Coffey analysis. There is a transaction in which the
investors furnish value that is subjected to the risks of the enterprise.
If the parent corporation folds, there will be no "product" to sell to
other investors. Moreover, the buyer is purposely kept uninformed 67
and does not receive the right to participate in the management of the
pyramid operation. His only job is to attract other investors; he is given
no decision-making authority. Finally, he is solicited by promises of
great wealth.8 There is no question that this sort of transaction
presents abuses similar to those found in many stock promotions
of new ventures. Thus, the SEC policy of disclosure, as contained
in the 1933 Act registration requirements and the 1934 Act antifraud
sanctions, is relevant to the problem. 69 In addition, pyramid schemes
67. See id. at 476:
The Koscot Manual describes the reasoning behind the approach and its opera-
tion in the following manner: "DON'T GO INTO DETAILS. Never explain
the program to a prospect before bringing him to an Opportunity Meeting. Do
not mention Kosmetics or give any particulars, as many people will prejudge
the program and decide it is not for them before they see the presentation."
68. The "opportunity meetings" are carefully orchestrated to present an illusion of
wealth. Salesmen are encouraged to borrow money so that they can impress potential
"investors" with their expensive clothes and cars. Salesmen are also instructed to tell
an investor that they have "discovered a wonderful financial opportunity that will fit
him like a glove!" Id. at 475-76.
69. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, DIsCLosuRE TO INVESTORS (1969)
(Wheat Report) (disclosure aspects of the securities laws). Some commentators have
argued that disclosure is an ineffective tool against this kind of fraud. See Comment,
Pyramid Sales: Dare To Be Regulated, 61 GEo. L.J. 1257, 1263 (1973); Note, Federal
Regulation of Pyramid Sales Schemes, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 137, 145. Indeed, one attorney
has said about pyramid schemes: "We explain to people that it's a fraud, that they'll
probably lose money, that they'll wind up cheating their friends and when we get
through, they still say 'I'm going to try it.'" N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1973, at 39, col. 1.
See also Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions,
1973 Wis. L. REv. 400, 410-20, for an empirical study of the Truth-in-Lending Act's
disclosure requirements. The author of that study concludes that most low-income con-
sumers rely on their personal relationship with the salesman rather than on the facts
disclosed. The argument against the effectiveness of SEC regulation through full dis-
closure overlooks a number of significant points. First, the SEC is moving toward a
policy of warning potential investors against worthless schemes. See, e.g., SEC Secu-
rities Act Release No. 5396 (June 1, 1973) ("poison paragraph" requirement for new
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and other frauds affect the securities markets by draining capital away
from legitimate business.7 0
The SEC has indicated on some occasions that it believes spe-
cial legislation is needed to curb pyramid schemes,"1 and it has
-taken the position that it should be given authority to regulate in the
area.7" In November 1971, the SEC published a release stating its in-
tention to consider multilevel distributorships to be securities. 3 The
release rejected the literal Howey definition and, concentrating
on the policy discussion in Joiner, Howey, and Tcherepnin, adopted the
Coffey analysis.74
Although the pyramid scheme possesses those characteristics of a se-
curity that signal the need for securities law protections, it is also
necessary to consider whether regulation by some other method
is more appropriate. The first possibility is through common law deceit
actions.75  There are, however, no reported cases using deceit to allow
recovery against pyramid schemes. The probable reason is that the
required strict proof of the elements of deceit is too difficult to sustain,
especially when there is the possibility of a rule 1Ob-5 action. 70
A more successful approach has been realized under consumer pro-
tection legislation. The pyramid scheme has been held to violate state
issues). Second, the expense, delay, and detail required in the prospectus may deter po-
tential violators. Third, the finding of a "security" for federal law purposes also means
that the states may regulate under their blue sky laws, using their "fair, just, and equi-
table" standard to prevent registration or suspend solicitation. Finally, it is difficult to
imagine a case involving pyramid sales that does not present a claim under SEC rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
70. See, e.g., Casey, Corporate Responsibility as Seen from the S.E.C., Bus. & Soc'Y
REv., Spring 1972, at 24, 27 (stressing the importance of efficient use of the limited
available venture capital).
71. See [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. [ 79,367 (May 9, 1973)
(report of address by SEC Chairman Cook before the Society of American Business
Writers).
72. See Letter from William Casey, SEC Chairman, to Senator Harrison A. Wil-
liams, Jr. and Representative John E. Moss, Sept. 4, 1972, reprinted in part in BNA
Snc. REG. & L. REP. No. 168, at A-3 (Sept. 13, 1972).
73. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971); see SEC Securities Ex.
change Act Release No. 9387 (Nov. 30, 1971).
74. The SEC credited the Hawaiian Supreme Court for the definition used, but, as
has been seen, the analysis is based on Coffey's article. See note 40 supra.
75. See W. PRoSsER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 683-736 (4th ed. 1971).
76. The elements of deceit are reliance, scienter, causation, misrepresentation of a
material fact, and damages. Id. For a discussion of the difference between securities
law fraud and common law deceit, see 3 L. Loss, SEcrtrrms REGULATION 1430-45 (2d
ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].https://openscholars ip.wustl. du/law_l wreview/vol1974/iss5/1
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laws against both "deceptive practices' 77 and "deceptive advertising.178
The problem is that this approach depends on vigorous enforcement
by public law-enforcement agencies, and, as some commentators have
suggested, those agencies are too understaffed and overworked to pro-
vide adequate investigation and enforcement.79 Moreover, it is neces-
sary to adopt a very broad reading of the typical consumer statute to
reach pyramid-type schemes."'
A few cases8' have held that pyramid schemes violate federal lottery
laws, since the investor's prospects of profit are dependent on the
"chance" that his purchasers will provide him with override commis-
sions. This approach has been criticized on a number of grounds.83
First, there does not really appear to be the kind of "chance" in a pyra-
mid that exists in a lottery. 4 Secondly, courts are reluctant to con-
strue penal statutes broadly. Thirdly, a criminal action does not ade-
quately provide for compensation of the defrauded investor."5
At least two bills have been introduced in Congress to deal with the
pyramid problem. One would have amended the 1933 Act specifically
77. See Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682
(Super. Ct. Ch. 1972) (based on N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 56:8-1, -2-8 (1964)); State v. ITM,
Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (based on N.Y. Exac. LAw
1 63(12) (McKinney 1951)).
78. See People ex rel. Kelley v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 37 Mich. App. 447, 195
N.W.2d 43 (1972) (based on MicH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 445.801-.803 (1967)).
79. See Lorenz, Consumer Fraud and the San Diego District Attorney's Office, 8
SAN DiEo L. REv. 47 (1971); Comment, Private and Public Remedies for Fraudulent
Business Practices in California: The Importance of a Strong Public Role, 6 LOYoLA
(L.A.) L Rnv. 312 (1973).
80. See 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 220 (1973).
There are also state securities statutes in the area, but they have been criticized be-
cause their penalties are so minor as to make prosecution "hardly worth the effort."
Wall Street J., Dec. 8, 1972, at 22, col. 1.
81. See, e.g., Zebelman v. United States, 339 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1964); Sherwood
& Roberts Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash. 2d 630, 409 P.2d 160 (1967).
82. 18 U.S.C. H 1301-06 (1970, Supp. IV, 1974).
83. See Comment, Trade Regulation: Examination of Games of Chance and Re-
ferral Selling on Sales Promotional Devices, 17 KAN. L. RV. 668 (1969). See gener-
ally Note, supra note 69.
84. The elements of a lottery are (1) a prize, (2) awarded by chance, (3) for a
consideration. See, e.g., M. Lippincott Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Childress, 204 So. 2d 919,
921 (Fla. App. 1967). Some courts have held that no "chance" is involved in a lottery.
See First Discount Corp. v. Cua, 117 Ohio App. 105, 190 N.E.2d 695 (1962); Yoder
v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
85. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 959.1-67.1 to -67.3 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
5.122 (1970).
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to include the pyramid scheme within the definition of investment con-
tract.8 6 The other bill, introduced by Senator Mondale would have cre-
ated criminal sanctions against pyramids. 87 Neither bill made it out of
committee. Moreover, the Mondale proposal has been criticized be-
cause it had definitional problems and its criminal sanctions would
apply to the small investor who solicits as well as the man at the top
of the pyramid. 8
The most reasonable alternative to SEC regulation is Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) action. The FTC has moved against some pyra-
mid operators"9 on the basis of an "unfair practice" claim under section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.90 The difficulty is that the
FTC has, until recently, been restricted to case-by-case adjudication,
an extremely inefficient regulatory tool."' Moreover, the delay92 inherent
in the ad hoc method is hardly effective against the pyramid scheme,
which has a planned limited life span. The FTC does publish industry-
wide guides, 93 but they are not binding as rules of law; the FTC must
still prove a section 5 violation in court.0 4 Moreover, until early 1975,
there was only limited judicial authority for the proposition that the
FTC had rulemaking authority25 And while the 1975 amendments
to the Federal Trade Commission Act give the Commission authority
86. S. 3983, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (introduced by Senator Tower).
87. S. 1939, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The bill had been introduced the pre-
vious year, also by Senator Mondale. S. 4043, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
88. See Note, Regulation of Pyramid Sales Ventures, 15 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 117
(1973). The same problem occurs with the SEC approach. In its Release No. 5211,
supra note 73, the SEC warned that anyone selling the scheme would be considered a
broker or underwriter. Conceivably, as in the Mondale proposal, the net would be cast
so wide that one would catch the very people whom the regulation is trying to protect.
The only answer to this problem is that the SEC has not, and is not likely to, move
against the small investor, although that does not prevent the possibility of a private ac-
tion.
89. See, e.g., Bestline Prods. Corp., 3' TR.AD REo. REp. 11 20,350 (FTC June 13,
1973); Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 20,372, at 20,261 (FTC May 31,
1973); Koscot I, 2 TRADE REG. REP. 20,019 (FTC May 24, 1972).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
91. See K. DAvis, AD ISTRATuE LAw TmxT 151 (3d ed. 1972).
92. See Johnson, Consumer Rights and the Regulatory Crisis, 20 CATH. U.L. REv.
424, 438 (1971).
93. See FTC General Procedure, 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (1975).
94. See, e.g., FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 48 (1965).
95. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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to make rules governing unfair or deceptive acts or practices, 6 it is not
certain that the Commission will vigorously exercise its power in the
field of pyramid schemes. Finally, there is considerable question
whether consumers can obtain monetary redress through the actions of
the FTC. 7
Although the FTC may prove to be an effective regulator in this
area,98 it seems more efficacious that the SEC, with experience and
success in the field, take the lead in regulation. It has been seen that
pyramid schemes present the types of abuses that the securities acts
were intended to correct; it now appears that the SEC is the most ap-
propriate vehicle of regulation as well.
2. Franchise Agreements: "Solely from the Efforts of Another"
One of the fastest growing forms of business organization during the
1960's was the franchise. It was estimated in 1969 that 150 new
franchises were opened every working day of the year."9 In 1970 a
Senate panel found that franchises accounted for over $100 billion in
sales, almost ten percent of the gross national product. 100 The early
1970's however, witnessed a drop in the popularity of franchises' as
the abuses associated with them became apparent.
96. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2193 (codified at
7 U.S.C.A. § 57(a) (Supp. I, 1975)), amending 15 U.S.C. § 57 (1970).
97. The traditional view has been that there is no private remedy. See FTC v.
Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929): "Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does
not provide private persons with an administrative remedy for private wrongs. The for-
mal complaint is brought in the Commission's name; the prosecution is wholly that of
the Government .... ." Many commentators have urged, however, that Justice Bran-
deis' comment was careless dictum and have asserted that a private right does exist. See,
e.g., Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Need
for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 357 (1972); Sebert, Obtaining
Monetary Redress for Consumers Through Action by the Federal Trade Commission,
57 MINN. L. REv. 225 (1972). The FTC has recently indicated that it has the power
to seek restitution on behalf of victims of deceptive practices, but only in very limited
circumstances. See Curtis Publishing Co., No. 8800 (FTC June 30, 1972).
98. The American Bar Association has severely criticized the FTC:
The recurrent flaws of FTC enforcement-failures of detection, undercommit-
ment of resources to important projects, timidity in instituting formal proceed-
ings and failure to engage in an effective compliance program-tend to out-
weigh its occasional successes.
ABA COMMSSION TO STUDY THE FTC, REPORT 9 (1969).
99. See Wall Street J., Sept. 10, 1969, at 36, col. 1.
100. See S. REp. No. 1344, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
101. See Goodwin, supra note 58.
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There are two basic types of franchise organization. 10 2  Under the
"product and service" system, the franchisor licenses the distribution of
his manufactured products under his name and trademark. Common
examples are gasoline and automobile companies. The second type of
franchise is the "trademark license," in which the franchisee purchases
the right to sell goods and services he produces under the franchisor's
name. The best example of this type is the fast-food business.
Although there were early attempts to bring the franchise within the
purview of the securities acts,10 3 it was not until the late 1960's that
an attempt was made to develop a consistent theory. Since the fourth
element of Howey was obviously not met in the case of an active fran-
chisee, an alternative theory was needed. The first attempt was the
result of Justice Traynor's risk-capital approach in Silver Hills. The
California Attorney General constructed three hypothetical franchise
situations that raised the issue of whether a security existed.1'0  The
first, when the franchisee participates only nominally in the enterprise,
was clearly a security under a liberal reading of Howey. The second,
where the franchisee actively participates in the enterprise and the
franchisor provides goods and services, was construed to fall outside the
securities acts. The third, where the franchisee actively participates but
the value he furnishes constitutes risk value, was a difficult question.
The Attorney General reasoned that in the third situation the franchi-
see was in reality investing in two separate business ventures. One was
the operation of the franchised business, and the other was the enter-
prise conducted by the franchisor financed by the franchisee's risk capi-
tal. Two years later, the Georgia Attorney General adopted the Califor-
nia "dual-investment" theory, although he argued that its application
should be limited to situations in which the franchisor was so under-
capitalized that he needed the franchisee's investment to produce the
102. See J. CURRY, PARTNERs FOR PRoFrr (1966); E. LEwis & R. HANCOCK, Tnu
FRANCmSE SYSTEm OF DISTRmTIoN (1963). See also Note, Franchisor Liability Under
Securities Law, 13 WAsHBuRN L.. 68 (1974).
103. See, e.g., Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mont. 1964) (retail stores
held security); Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., [1962-1964 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SE C. L. REP. 11 91,293 (D.D.C. 1963) (drug stores held no secu-
rity); In re Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947) (auto franchise held evidence of indebt-
edness). See generally Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agree-
ment as a Security Under Securities Acts, Including 10b-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAW.
1311 (1969).
104. 49 CAL. Op. ATT'Y GN. 124 (1967).
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necessary products. 10 5 These theories have been severely criticized by
commentators. The major focus of their attack has been on the subjec-
tive nature of the test, the characterization of the risk that the franchis-
or's enterprise will be successful as an investment risk and not an ordi-
nary business risk, the limitation of the term "security" to risky ven-
tures, and the fear that new venture capital will be impeded.'"°
While the virtues and defects of the California "dual-investment"
theory as an alternative to Howey were being debated,o' a federal dis-
trict court in Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc."'0 held that a
restaurant franchise arrangement was not a "security" within the mean-
ing of section 2(1) of the 1933 Act. The franchise agreement provided
that the franchisor, a national restaurant chain, would have the right
to control the operations of the restaurant, including daily financial
affairs and the activities of the manager, whom the franchisor was
to select. The franchisee, a sophisticated investor, retained the
right to terminate the manager's employment and generally was
contemplated to "play an active, if severely circumscribed, role in
the conduct of the restaurant."'1 9  After considering in detail both the
contractual rights of the parties and the actual method of operating the
restaurant, the court concluded that the exercise of control over the
franchised operation was not determinative; since the franchisee
exercised some control, and had delegated or abandoned other powers
under the agreement, the franchise was a "business which the [fran-
chisee] could control and included the normal risks incident to opera-
105. 1969 GA. Op. ATr'Y GFN. 661, 664-65:
mhis test essentially recognizes the fact that if a franchising system is in its
infancy to such a degree that the individual franchisee might realistically be
held to have provided risk capital in the enterprise as a whole to the extent
that its success or failure will necessarily depend upon the success or failure
of every other individual franchisee as well as the franchisor, then his invest-
ment constitutes an investment contract ....
Thus . . . promoters undertaking to establish a new franchise system will
fall within the ambit of securities regulation if the franchisor is so thinly or
under-capitalized as to require franchisees in order to meet its obligations to
furnish goods and services to its franchisees ....
106. See California Franchise Regulation; 24 VAND. L. Rv. 638 (1971). For an
interesting discussion of new venture capital financing and the inherent difficulties, see
Cronson, Venture Capital Financing-Legal and Financial Considerations, 48 NoTRE
DAME LAw. 614 (1973).
107. The California approach was certainly not without its supporters. See Good-
win, supra note 58; Note, supra note 58.
108. 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), modified, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
109. Id. at 645.
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tion of any enterprise." 110 Thus, because the investor in Mr. Steak was
informed as to the nature of the investment and had the right, if largely
unexercised, to effect the investment's success, the transaction failed
to satisfy the "solely" requirement of the Howey formula."'
Federal courts since Mr. Steak have uniformly"12 held that franchises
are not "securities" within the meaning of the federal acts. Some
courts have routinely considered the Howey "solely" language in reach-
ing this result,"13 while others have used the Ninth Circuit Turner test."
14
These latter courts have stressed the kinds of duties for which the fran-
chisees were responsible and, although purportedly applying the more
liberal "essential managerial" test of Turner,"5 have found that these
duties take the arrangement outside the protection of the securities
laws.
One area seldom discussed in the cases is the potential for abuse
that is inherent in the franchise field. First, there is generally
a gross disparity of economic power between the franchisor and fran-
chisee,"-6 and the former has not been unwilling in some cases to abuse
110. Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of this "turn-key" agreement, where the
franchisee is given a choice whether to participate or not, see Chapman v. Rudd Paint
& Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Continental Mktg. Corp. v.
SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968).
111. Although the court could have stopped there, it went on to discuss the possible
application of the risk-capital approach. While the court suggested that the dual-invest-
ment theory was "too extreme," it expressed approval of the Silver Hills approach so
long as it "limit[s] the 1933 Act to situations where exceptionally high risk, speculative
franchises are involved." 324 F. Supp. at 647.
112. In two cases, courts characterized the sellers as franchisors, but a close reading
of the facts indicates that their operations were much closer to multilevel distributorships
than to legitimate franchises. See Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc.,
448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D.
Jil. 1973).
113. See, e.g., L.H.M., Inc. v. Lewis, 371 F. Supp. 395 (D.NJ. 1974); Schuler, Inc.
v. Better Equip. Launder Center, Inc. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 94,074 (D. Mass. 1973); Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 348 F. Supp.
799 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Cobb v. Network Cinema Corp., 339 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ga.
1972).
114. See, e.g., Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. f 94,562 (9th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d
Cir. 1973); Nash & Associates, Inc. v. Lumis of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.
1973); Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally Hannan
& Thomas 268.
115. See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra.
116. See Gellhorn, Limitation on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancella-
tions, 1967 Duxr L.L 465.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/1
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that power.117 Second, the use of the names of celebrities' and high-
pressure sales tactics tends to block investor access to vital informa-
tion.119 Third, the costs of obtaining a franchise are sometimes hidden
from the franchisee under the designation "miscellaneous fees" or
"advertising charges." 120  Fourth, the franchisor often fails to disclose
the profits he receives in the form of kickbacks from suppliers. 121
Fifth, undue pressure is often brought against the franchisee by
threats of termination. 22  Finally, the effect on the securities markets
is substantial. Many of the companies that fueled the "hot-issue"
craze of the late 1960's were franchising ventures.123
Most of these abuses could be controlled by a system of stringent dis-
closure such as is provided by the securities laws. The SEC has
indicated that it does not consider itself to be without power in the
field. 12 4  Moreover, the franchise would probably fit into the Coffey
formula. There is a transaction in which a buyer furnishes initial value
to the seller. That value is subject to the risk of the enterprise, since
it is to some extent dependent on the continued good will of the fran-
chised name.' 2 5  Furthermore, the franchisee is induced to invest in
the enterprise with the expectation of economic benefit.
It is the fourth element of the Coffey analysis which presents diffi-
culties. In most franchises, the buyer is not familiar with the
operations of the parent enterprise. Secondly, he is led to expect
profits from his management of the enterprise, as well as profits from
the future success of the parent enterprise in generating nationwide
117. See, e.g., C. Robert Ingram, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 256 F.2d 684, 687 (10th
Cir. 1958).
118. See Goodwin, The Name of the Franchising Game is: The Franchise Fee, The
Celebrity, or Basic Operations?, 25 Bus. LAw. 1403 (1970).
119. See Axelrad, Franchising-Changing Legal Skirmish Lines or Armageddon?, 26
Bus. LAw. 695 (1971); Lefkowitz, Franchising Abuses--One State's Approach, 75 CASE
& COM., July-Aug. 1970, at 14.
120. See H. BRowN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUsTiNo 10 (1969).
121. Id. at 14-16.
122. id. at 22.
123. In August 1969, there were 173 fast-food operations alone that had either gone
public or were in registration. See Elliott, Speculative Bellyache?, BARRoN's, Aug. 25,
1969, at 11.
124. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211, supra note 73.
125. This factor was overlooked by the court in Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,562 (9th Cir. 1974). The court
rejected the risk-capital approach in franchising cases by stating that the franchisee's suc-
cess is totally independent of the success or failure of the franchisor. That contention
is contrary to the whole theory of franchising.
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recognition. It is the very nature of a franchise, its fundamental dis-
tinguishing feature, that part of the return on the franchisee's invest-
ment is dependent upon the success of the parent enterprise.
Moreover, a functional analysis of the "typical" franchise agreement re-
veals that the franchisor retains control of the profit-generating business
decisions, such as initial purchase, site selection, daily operating plan,
marketing, and accounting. '2  Thus, the franchisee is basically in the
same position as the investor who relies on the securities acts for protec-
tion against unscrupulous promoters; he needs full disclosure to make
an informed judgment about an enterprise upon which he is dependent
for a return on his investment.
The securities laws also provide the most appropriate means of regu-
lation. Although some courts have held against the franchisor on the
basis of common law fraud, 11 7 this does not seem to be a promising
remedy for the same reasons it was unsuitable in the pyramid scheme
cases. 12  The major difficulty with any contract action is that the
franchise relationship may be characterized as a "sale," an "agency,"
or something between the two. 29 Nevertheless, at least one commen-
tator 3 0 has urged that the principle of unconscionability"'3  be ex-
panded to cover the franchise situation. The problem is that this
approach may be useful in pursuing an individual remedy, but it cannot
serve a prophylactic function.
Two bills regulating franchising were introduced in the Senate in
1967. s2 Neither bill passed, and both were criticized for defini-
tional vagueness. 33 Further, the bills only related to the termination
provisions of the franchise agreement, and did not purport to cover the
problem of undisclosed profits and costs. Finally, Congress has not
been extremely successful in its only other attempt to regulate fran-
126. For an empirical study confirming this analysis, see Comment, The Franchise
Agreement: A Security for Purposes of Regulation, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 130. It does not
appear necessary to adopt the approach that characterizes the labor of the franchisee
as part of the initial investment in the enterprise.
127. See, e.g., Venture Inv. Co. v. Schaefer, 478 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1973).
128. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
129. See, e.g., Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distrib., Inc. v. Drewry's Ltd., 256 Iowa 899,
906-07, 129 N.W.2d 731, 736 (1964).
130. See Gellhorn, supra note 116.
131. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1972).
132. S. 2507, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ("Franchise Distribution Act of 1967");
S. 2321, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ("Franchise Competitive Practice Act of 1967").
133. See H. BRowN, supra note 120, at 88.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/1
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chises.1 4 California has adopted a comprehensive franchise law,'3 5
but it is too early to judge how effective it will be.
Once again, the FTC has taken some steps"3 6 to enter the franchise
regulation field. Even before the Commission had obtained rulemak-
ing authority in the area of unfair or deceptive acts or practices, 137 it
had proposed a disclosure rule for franchising.'3 8 It seems ironic that
the federal agency with the most experience in effective disclosure, the
SEC, should be prevented from exercising its jurisdiction, while an-
other agency, a neophyte in the field of rulemaking,13 9 should be as-
signed the task.
The area of franchising does differ from the pyramid sales area in
that there are many legitimate businesses operating in the field. These
businesses are already under close regulation because of antitrust prob-
lems in the areas of price fixing, 40 tying arrangements, 141 and location
restrictions. 42 It has been the philosophy of the American securities
laws, however, that the interests of these legitimate operations must
bow to the interests of the investor.
134. Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (1970), discussed in Note,
The Judicial Treatment of the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 62 MICH. L. Rnv. 310
(1963); Note, The Automobile Dealer Franchise Act: A "New Departure" in Federal
Legislation, 52 Nw. L. REv. 253 (1957).
135. CAL. CoRP. CODE. § 31000 et seq. (Deering Supp. 1974). The law provides for
both full disclosure of offered franchises, id. §§ 31110-24, and prohibition of fraudulent
sales, id. §§ 31200-03, 31210-11. See Augustine & Hrusaff, The California Franchise
Investment Law, 46 J. STATE BAR CAL. 50 (1971); Damon, Franchise Investment Law,
2 PAc. L. 27 (1971).
136. The FTC has won consent decrees against franchisor misrepresentation. See
Meal or Snack Sys., Inc., 75 F.T.C. 497 (1969); Mercury Electronics, Inc., 74 F.T.C.
548 (1968).
137. See source cited note 96 supra and accompanying text.
138. 36 Fed. Reg. 21,607 (1971). For an analysis of the proposed rule, see Rosen-
field, A Look at the Proposed F.T.C. Rule on Franchising, 27 Bus. LAw. 907 (1972).
139. Indeed, the proposed regulations have been attacked as vague, burdensome, and
difficult or impossible to perform. See Zeidman, Regulation of Franchising by the
Federal Trade Commission: A Critique of the Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, 28 Bus.
LAw. 135 (1972).
140. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). See also Com-
ment, Resale Price Maintenance, Refusals to Deal, and the Gasoline Retailer-A Search
for Alternative Remedial Deterrants, 18 VRLL. L. REv. 648 (1973).
141. See Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). See
also Day, Exclusive Dealing, Tying, and Reciprocity-A Reappraisal, 29 Osno ST. L.J.
539 (1968).
142. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). See generally Comment,
Franchising and the Antitrust Laws: An Overview, 41 TENx. L. Rav. 535 (1974).
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3. The Commodities Game: "Common Enterprise" or Not
The commodity futures contract has been defined as an agreement
to purchase some fixed amount of a commodity at a future date for
a fixed price.143  There is, however, usually no intent to take delivery
of the commodity; most commitments are offset by acquiring a corre-
sponding offer to sell at the time of delivery. 14 4  While the organized
trading of futures has valuable benefits, 14 5 it can also be a vehicle for
investor speculation. 146 Regardless of their purpose, many people are
now actively trading on the commodity exchanges. 47
The question whether the ordinary futures contract is a security was
convincingly answered in the negative by a federal district court in
Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 48 Sinva,
a foreign financing and investment company, sued its broker for alleged
mishandling of its commodity account. The court, applying the Howey
test, reasoned that there was no "common enterprise to realize a profit"
between Sinva and its broker; there was simply a broker-client relation-
ship, with the latter in complete charge of deciding whether to accept
the commodity or offset in another trade.' 49 Further, the court noted
that the SEC should not be granted jurisdiction in light of a clear con-
gressional intent to regulate the commodities market through another
agency.' 50
Sinva and subsequent decisions'" have established that the ordinary
143. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 47 (1955).
144. By most estimates, less than 1% of the contracts are actually consummated by
delivery. See Note, Federal Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.I.
822, 825 (1951).
145. The trading aids in price determination, assists in the handling of after-harvest
movement, makes hedging possible, provides quotations which can be widely dissemi-
nated, facilitates a continuous market, and results in some changes of ownership. See
Irwin, Legal Status of Trading in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REV. 155 (1937).
146. See Campbell, Trading in Futures Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26
GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 215, 219 (1958).
147. The Senate reported in 1968 that trading for the previous year in the principal
agricultural products was at a record level of $75 billion annually with about 16 million
transactions. S. REP. No. 947, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
148. 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
149. Id. at 366.
150. Id. at 367. The Commodity Exchange Authority had regulatory authority in
the field, pursuant to the Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17a (1970), as
amended, Act of Oct. 23, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7
U.S.C.A. §§ 1-22 (Supp. I, 1975)).
151. See Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.
1974); Golding v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [current] CCH FE.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/1
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futures contract is not a security. Under certain circumstances, how-
ever, an option to buy or sell a future contract is a security. This con-
clusion is a result of another get-rich-quick promotion scheme. 52 In
this scheme, the "naked" commodity option, the investor purchases an
option to buy or sell (or both) a particular futures contract from (or
to) the promoter during a specified period at a fixed price. The
options are "naked" because the promoter does not purchase the con-
tract to which the customer's option relates. Instead, he invests the
purchasers money to generate additional capital. The investor profits
when he correctly guesses the position of the market at the future time
and exercises his option with the promoter. The investor loses if he
misreads the market, or if the promoter is unable to raise the capital to
pay his claim when the option is exercised. Unfortunately, the pro-
moters of the "naked" commodity option have been less than success-
ful in raising the capital.15  Not surprisingly, the securities commis-
sioners of several states154 asserted jurisdiction for ,the purpose of stop-
ping the "naked" option game.
While other courts 55 have litigated the question of whether the
naked option is a "security" under the blue sky laws, the major decision
in the area came from the California courts in People v. Puts & Calls,
Inc.156 The defendant in that case relied on three principal arguments.
First, it was contended that an option takes on the character of its un-
derlying instrument. Therefore, since Sinva had established that
futures are not securities, the option to purchase could not be one
either. Second, the defendant argued that there was no element of
SEc. L. RE. 94,896 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1974); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F.
Supp. 669 (M.D. Cal. 1973); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D.
La. 1972); Schwartz v. Bache & Co., 340 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
152. See Hannan & Thomas 269.
153. One such promoter, Harold Goldstein, declared bankruptcy after only two years
at the business with $17 million in assets but $76 million in liabilities. Id. at 270.
154. See 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 9722 (May 22, 1973) (Colorado Securities
Commissioner); 2 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 28,651 (May 29, 1973) (Missouri Secur-
ities Commissioner); 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 41,358 (Mar. 27, 1973) (Pennsylvania
Securities Commissioner); 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 47,655 (Mar. 16, 1973) (Utah
Securities Commissioner).
155. See Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Corp., 3 CCH BLUE SKY L.
RPx. 71,071 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 30, 1973) (finding "security"); International Com-
modity Trust, Inc. v. Fisher, 3 CCH BLuE SKY L. REP. 1 71,075 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May
14, 1973) (finding no "security"), overruling In re Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., 3 CCH
BLUB SKY L. RPx. 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Comm'n Order Feb. 23, 1973).
156. 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,090 (Cal. Sup. Ct. June 21, 1973).
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"common enterprise" since the success or failure of the individual in-
vestor in reading the market is the significant factor in realizing a profit.
Third, profit is not "solely" dependent on the efforts of a third
party. "' The Puts & Calls court had little difficulty with the three ar-
guments. On the first defense, the court reasoned that more than a
sale of options was involved; there was also a sale of an investment con-
tract. As to the other defenses, the court reasoned that the "profit"
of the investor was solely dependent on the ,ability of the third party
to raise additional capital by investing the commingled account of in-
vestors' payments. Strangely enough, 'the California court used 'the
Howey-Turner analysis and rejected a risk-capital' 8 or public policy1 9
approach.
Between the ordinary futures contract -and -the naked commodity op-
tion lies the discretionary commodities account. Under this plan, the
investor entrusts his money in a joint account, expecting profits solely
from the investment success of the broker. As the description
indicates, three elements of Howey, investment of money with the ex-
pectation of profit solely from -the efforts of another, are met. The
problem lies with the "common enterprise" requirement.
The first major attempt to define "common enterprise" came from
the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange
v. SEC. 60 Purchasers received notes secured by a second deed of trust
on property managed by the seller. The money was pooled and rein-
vested, the purchasers relying on the advertised expertise of the seller.
There was little question that this was a "common enterprise," since
157. These defenses are discussed in Borton & Abrahams, Options on Commodity Fu-
tures Contracts as Securities in California, 29 Bus. LAW. 867 (1974).
158. This type of investment fits perfectly into the Silver Hills risk-capital analysis.
The investors were primarily furnishing capital in a speculative, high-risk venture.
Moreover, the Turner approach is not too valuable here. As one commentator has sug-
gested, the idea that the "common enterprise" and "solely" elements are satisfied by rely-
ing on the fact that promoter solvency was necessary for a payoff confuses the two sep-
arate risks involved in Puts & Calls. The speculative risk purchased by the investor was
that he could guess the market; he did not intend to purchase the business risk that the
promoter would be able to pay. See Bloomenthal, Calls, Puts and Commodity Options,
2 SEc. REG. LJ. 101 (1974).
159. The court at one point said:
I'm acutely aware of the fact that simply because there may be a crying need
for regulation-and I think the evidence amply shows that-does not of itself
necessarily mean that there is to be regulation.
3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,090, at 67,385.
160. 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
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many investors were solicited and their capital pooled; in making this
finding, the court stated that the crucial element was that the "eco-
nomic welfare of the purchasers was inextricably woven with the ability
of [the seller] to meet its commitments."' 61  Thus, the court made it
clear that the "common enterprise" requirement was satisfied by either
a pooling of interests or a commonality of interest between purchaser
and seller. This contention has been accepted in numerous162 situa-
tions; it is strange that it has caused so much trouble in the commodities
area.
There was no indication in the early cases involving discretionary
accounts that the "common enterprise" element might not be satisfied.
In Maheu v. Reynolds & Co.' 63 the court rejected the contention that
there was no common enterprise by relying upon prior cases'64 and an
analysis of Howey. The lower court in Howey had reasoned that
there was no element of common enterprise since each owner looked
to his own individual citrus grove for profit.165 The Maheu court
thought it significant that the Supreme Court reversed the lower court
decision, and held that a common enterprise existed.' 66 The cases that
followed Maheu'17 routinely held that a discretionary account was a
security until the federal district court decision in Milnarik v. M-S Com-
modities, Inc. 68 In that case, an investor sued on the basis of his
161. Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
162. See notes 175-79 infra and accompanying text.
Further, this has never been a problem in the sale-leaseback arrangement. This
method of financing involves a sale by the promoter to the investor and a lease-back
to the promoter. The terms of the lease usually provide for a fixed rent plus a percent-
age of sales. The courts have uniformly held this to involve a security. See, e.g., Hu-
berman v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See gener-
ally Bruck, Investment Contracts: To Qualify or Not to Qualify?, 49 L.A. BAR BULz.
179 (1974); Note, The Expanding Definition of "Security": Sale-Leasebacks and Other
Commercial Leasing Arrangements, 1972 DuKE L.J. 1221.
163. 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
164. SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp.
245 (D. Minn. 1935); see 1 Loss 489.
165. See 151 F.2d at 715-17.
166. Although this result is probably correct, the court's argument is very weak. The
Supreme Court did reverse the lower court in Howey, but it based the decision of com-
mon enterprise on the fact that the capital invested by others helped Howey in its efforts
at successful management. 328 U.S. at 298.
167. See, e.g,, Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hanimill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
168. 320 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 887 (1972).
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broker's alleged failure to register his discretionary commodities ac-
count as a security under the 1933 Act. The Milnarik court purported
to accept the argument that the contract constituted a security; it based
its holding for the broker on the private-offering exemption. 10 The
holding was, however, at least partially based on the court's theory that
there was no "common enterprise" involved in the offering. Rather, the
court stated, the broker was simply selling individual agency-for-hire
contracts."' Although there was considerable doubt about the validity
of the court's exemption holding,""7 the Seventh Circuit, on appeal,
compounded the error by holding that there was no offering of a
"security." In so deciding, the court quoted extensively from the district
court's diota about the agency-for-hire relationship and observed that,
although the broker had many accounts, there was no commingling of
assets.
172
The Milnarik opinion has been followed in two other casesY.8
There is a good policy argument that application of the 1933 Act would
be inappropriate in Milnarik, ' 4 but the opinion, forced into the narrow
confines of the traditional Howey elements, relied on the wrong
rationale--the restrictions placed on the "common enterprise" element
are inconsistent with the prevailing views of the courts. One example,
the scotch whiskey warehouse cases, makes this clear. Courts have re-
169. 1933 Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
170. 320 F. Supp. at 1151.
171. The court did not properly apply the private offering exemption test from SEC
v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1952). Evidently, the broker had solicited money
on a nationwide scale. See 320 F. Supp. at 1150. If each contract was a security, as
the court indicated, the offering was to a large group of people, most of whom were
not possessed of investment sophistication.
The decision also misapplied policy considerations. The court felt that the disclosure
requirements of Schedule A of the 1933 Act would not be appropriate. Nonetheless
there was considerable need for disclosure about the broker's expertise in the com-
modities markets, which was the inducement for the contract.
172. 457 F.2d at 277.
173. Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Wasab-
wic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
174. The SEC has never really determined the amount of regulation it wishes to pur-
sue in the case of commodities accounts and related devices such as puts and calls. For
instance, in E.F. Hutton & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Suc. L. REP. f
79,007 (SEC 1973), the SEC took no position on whether a discretionary commodities
account was a security, but "suggested" that E.F. Hutton register it. But see Hayden,
Stone, Inc. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 79,262 (SEC 1973)
(computer-operated commodities account did not have necessary element of com-
monality).
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cently addressed the question whether an investment in which a broker
sells raw whiskey to an investor and, after three years of aging, resells
the alcohol, constitutes a "security.' ' 17' As in the case of the discre-
tionary commodity account, there is no pooling of investments and,
indeed, there is not even a requirement of other investors. Nonetheless,
mindful of the abuses' 76 that are associated with the transaction,
courts, 1 7 the SEC," 87 and blue sky commissioners'" have uniformly
held that the investments are securities.
Because the Milnarik court was so concerned with Howey, it failed
to analyze adequately the policy question. 8" Unlike the areas of fran-
chising and pyramid schemes, there is a federal agency that has been
given authority over the commodities field. The Commodity Exchange
Act was passed by Congress to regulate brokers who regularly trade on
the commodity exchanges.' 8 ' It contained provisions which regulated
excessive speculation, the financial responsibility of brokers, and
the handling of customer accounts, as well as a general antifraud
section. 182  The latter was construed to support a private right of ac-
175. The first whiskey warehouse craze occurred in the 1940's. See Penfield Co. v.
SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944); SEC v. Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70 (W.D.
Ky. 1942). There has recently been a revival of interest and court activity. See Glen-
Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Haffen-
den-Rimar Int'l, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Va. 1973); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Associates,
362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973).
176. The problem is that the investor is totally dependent on the broker, since there
are no published prices in the field. Some brokers overcharge their investors and fail
to disclose that overproduction of whiskey is now a factor. See BuslRMss WEEK, Feb.
17, 1973, at 81; NEWSWEEK, May 21, 1973, at 82; TnME, May 21, 1973, at 92.
177. See note 175 supra.
178. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5018 (Nov. 4, 1969); SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 8733 (Nov. 4, 1969).
179. See, e.g., [1973] PA. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. 49.
180. In fact, the court found it "unnecessary to comment on any question of policy
in order to dispose of this appeal." 457 F.2d at 277 n.5.
181. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922), codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1-17a (1970), as
amended, Act of Oct. 23, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7
U.S.C.A. §§ 1-22 (Supp. I, 1975)). See S. Rep. No. 947, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
182. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1970), as amended, Act of Oct. 23, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
463, §§ 403-04, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 6(a) (Supp. 1, 1975)) (regula-
tion of excessive speculation); id. § 6(d), as amended, Act of Oct. 23, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-463, § 103(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 6(a) (Supp. I, 1975)) (regulation of
handling of customer accounts); id. § 6(f), as amended, Act of Oct. 23, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-463, § 103(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 6(f) (Supp. I, 1975)) (regulation of
brokers' financial responsibility).
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tion,8 3 but the major regulation was done by the Commodity Exchange
Authority.8 4  Although there were cases under the antifraud sec-
tion, most concerned "churning" or market manipulation. 5 One case
rejected a securities claim premised on rule 10b-5 on the ground that
a futures contract is not a security, while another allowed a section
16(b) claim.' 6
There were, however, serious problems with this mode of regulation.
First, the Act covered only a limited number of commodities. 8 7  Sec-
ondly, although the commodities market was theoretically subject to
the same type of regulation as the securities market, there were practi-
cal difficulties of manpower and resources. As one writer has said:
The Authority, however, as it itself has noted, cannot continue the fine
job it has done to date, much less assume broader powers, under present
appropriations and staff-size limitation. It cannot be expected to fully
oversee a 60 billion dollar industry with an annual appropriation of 1.5
million dollars. The SEC has a budget ten times as large as the Author-
ity's to regulate an industry one-eighth the size.' s8
In response to the need for a stronger and more expansive regulatory
scheme, Congress recently enacted the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974,189 which transferred the authority vested in
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Commodity Exchange Commission,
and the Commodity Exchange Authority under the Commodity Ex-
183. Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
184. This body could revoke the license of a broker, 7 U.S.C. § 8(a) (1970), as
amended, Act of Oct. 23, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, §§ 103(a)-(c), 88 Stat. 1389 (codi-
fied at 7 U.S.C.A. § 8(a) (Supp. I, 1975)), and issue cease and desist orders, id. §
13(a). The authority could initiate complaints and hold hearings. See 17 C.F.R. § 0.53
(1974). See generally Vogelson, Tightened Regulation for Commodity Exchanges, 55
A.B.AJ. 858 (1969).
185. See Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), noted in 57 MINN. L.
Rev. 1243 (1973) (market manipulation); Booth v. Peavey County Community Servs.,
430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970) (churning); Johnson v. Arthur Espy, Shearson, Hammill
& Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (churning); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont &
Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968) (churning).
186. McNurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. La. 1972) (claim al-
lowed); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (futures contracts not securities).
187. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), as amended, Act of Oct. 23, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
463, §§ 101 (a) (1), 201-02, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Supp. I, 1975)).
188. Wolff, Comparative Federal Regulation of the Commodities Exchanges and the
National Securities Exchanges, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 223, 263-64 (1969).
189. Act of Oct. 23, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, §§ 101, 103-409, 411-18, 88 Stat.
1389, amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17a (1970) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2, 4, 4a, 6-6g,
6i-9a, 11-13, 15-16, 18-22 (Supp. I, 1975)).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/1
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change Act to the newly formed Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion. The Act operates essentially in four ways: (1) it substantially
expands the subject matter regulated, (2) it broadens fraud protection
and gives the Commission power to control excessive speculation, (3)
it provides for the registration and regulation of floor brokers, futures
commission merchants, commodity trading advisors, and commodity
pool operators, and (4) it empowers the commission to regulate boards
of trade and to designate them as contract markets. 90
There is no question that a discretionary commodity account has the
potential for abuse that is present whenever one person gives money
to another to manage and make a profit. The danger of nondisclosure
and fraud is just as great for the individual when his money is segre-
gated as when it is pooled. It is unfortunate that unthinking reliance
on the Howey terminology can blind a court to the essential policy ram-
ifications of the transaction involved.
4. The Housing Boom: Expectation of "Profit"
One of the defenses offered in Howey was that the investors were
merely purchasing valuable property in the hope of "profiting" from
an increase in land values. The Supreme Court clearly saw through
the argument; the profit was to come through the management
expertise of Howey-in-the-Hilis, not through a general appreciation in
land value. Subsequent courts also have had little difficulty with the
defense so long as the land's value is dependent upon the efforts of
the promoter and the only return expected is monetary.' 9 '
A more difficult case is presented by the condominium. 192 The pur-
chaser of a condominium does buy something of present value, and he
may expect no monetary return at all-he may just be buying a
190. Id.
191. See Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Lake Hauser Es-
tates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972), noted in 5 LoYoLA L. Rnv. 417 (1972); State
v. American Campground, Inc., 3 CCH BLuE SKY L. RF_'. 71,064 (Ore. Sup. Ct. 1972);
Dellico, Rudolph & Grant, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. If
78,882 (SEC 1972). See generally Note, Regulation of Real Estate Syndications: An
Overview, 49 WASH. L. Rtv. 137 (1973).
192. It has been estimated that three out of every five new housing starts in Detroit
involves condominiums. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 1973, at 58. It has also been stated that
over 75% of new construction in Florida involves condominiums. BusiNEss WEEK,
Nov. 4, 1972, at 82. See generally Note, Securities: Another Way to Regulate the Re-
sort Development Boom, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 104 (1974).
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residence. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see why the
securities laws should be involved. If, however, the purchaser is buy-
ing an investment-something that he expects will return a profit-
there is every reason to want the protection of the securities acts.
Thus, the crucial task in the area is to distinguish between the invest-
ment and the residence. At first, the SEC pursued a case-by-case
method. One of the first elements that was held to signal the exist-
ence of a security was "rent-pooling."' 93 Under this arrangement, the
owner rents his unit during the year, but does not receive the return
from that unit alone. Instead, the rent from all units is pooled and
the individual owners receive a percentage. It is not too difficult to
see that the investment promise of rental profits outweighs the residen-
tial aspect of the arrangement. 0 4  The second element to be iso-
lated was a sale coupled with a long-term management contract.'03
The arrangement looks more like the traditional Howey situation and
less like 'the purchase of a home. The agreements also frequently con-
tain restrictions on times of owner occupancy. The third element
that was isolated was the effect of advertising. Condominiums may
become securities if they are offered and sold through promotional ef-
forts that emphasize the economic benefits for the purchaser to be
derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter.'"" This kind of
analysis, first discussed by Justice Jackson in the Joiner case, 197 has
been employed frequently by the SEC in other areas. 198 It implicitly
recognizes that a promoter may be offering a security even if the in-
vestor accepts something less.' 99
These factors were finally consolidated in an SEC release stating the
193. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4877 (Aug. 8, 1967).
194. See San Diego-Maui Group, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L.
REP. 78,444 (SEC 1972) (comments on rent-pooling in refusal to grant no-action
letter).
195. See, e.g., Edward S. Jaffry, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 78,395 (SEC 1972).
196. See SEC v. Royal Hawaiian Management Corp., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,982, at 96,338 (M.D. Cal. 1967).
197. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
198. In Longines Symphonette Soc'y, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FFD. SEC.
L. REP. 79,151 (SEC 1972), the SEC stated that it would refuse a no-action letter
on an offering of commemorative medallions until investment language was removed
from the sales literature.
199. See generally Hannan & Thomas 239-40. For a general discussion of these fac-
tors, see Note, supra note 192.
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guidelines for distinguishing between a security and a residence. 20 0
The significance of the SEC response to condominiums is the ap-
proach that was used. Instead of attempting to distinguish between
the "profits" expected by the purchaser of a security and of a resi-
dence within the Howey framework, the Commission adopted a
more functional analysis, identifying those factors that make the
transaction look more like one that presents abuses that could be
corrected by the securities acts. With this approach, the SEC,2 ' blue
sky commissioners,20 2 and commentators 20 3 have had little difficulty in
identifying a security in this area.
The Howey element of "expectation of profit" has, however, caused
some difficulty in one facet of the housing area, the cooperative housing
association. In a typical arrangement, the developer buys the land,
builds units, and organizes an association composed of unit-owners.
The association elects officers and then purchases the development
from the promoter. Thus, there are securities aspects to the transac-
tion (ownership of "shares" in an association) and residential aspects
200. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 4, 1973). See also SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5382 (Apr. 9, 1973) (containing reminder that sales literature on con-
dominiums constitute illegal offers if offering is not registered).
201. The SEC is still presented with the necessity of case-by-case adjudication. Nev-
ertheless, it does have the option of issuing general guidelines releases. See Kaiser Aetna,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 1 79,471 (SEC 1973); Tahoe
Donner Ski Bowl, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FFD. Sac. L. RaP. % 79,440 (SEC
1973); Innisfree Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REn. 79,398
(SEC 1973).
Moreover, many developers seem to be unaware of the SEC action. As of August
1, 1973, 59 resort condominium registrations had been filed. It has been estimated that
between 500 and 700 more qualify as securities, but remain unregistered. Of course,
the developer may just be wary of the time and expense involved. Of the 59 registra-
tions on file, the price of registration has ranged from $4000 to $25,000 and the time
of review from 32 days to one year. See Ellsworth, Condominiums Are Securities?, 2
REAL ESTATE L.J. 694, 698 (1974).
202. See, e.g., 2 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 38,759 (1973) (Ohio Securities Commis-
sioner); 2 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 41,341 (1973) (Pennsylvania Blue Sky Commis-
sioner). A few states have handled the condominium/securities problem through reg-
istration. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw. § 352-e (McKinney 1968, Supp. 1973). See
also HIIw~x REv. STAT. § 485-6(14) (Supp. 1973) (sale of condominium exempt trans-
action).
203. The literature on condominiums is quite extensive. Recent articles include
Clurman, Condominiums as Securities: A Current Look, 19 N.Y.L.F. 457 (1974);
Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Securities Regulation of Condominium Offers, 19 N.Y.L.F.
473 (1974); Grimes & King, A Look at Condominium Offerings Under the Federal Se.
curities Laws-For the Idaho Lawyer, 9 IDaso L. REv. 149 (1973).
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(the cooperatives are intended to be full-year residences with no rental
arrangements).
The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Forman
v. Community Services, Inc.,204 was recently faced with a difficult
decision in this area. The cooperative involved was a non-profit cor-
poration financed with state aid. In holding that participation in
the corporation did not constitute a security, the court had to address
two theories for finding jurisdiction, sale of "stock" and "investment
contract." The court disposed of the first argument by pointing out
that the plaintiffs had no right to an apportionment of tangible profits,
a normal incident of "stock" ownership. 20 5 The second claim was
caught in the inflexible throes of the Howey analysis, and the "expecta-
tion of profits" language. It was argued that the tax and social benefits
that inured to the purchasers constituted "profit" within the meaning
of Howey. The court rejected the tax-benefit theory on the basis that
tax advantages were merely an incident of real estate ownership, and
not a result of securities ownership.200 Secondly, the court reasoned,
indirect social benefits of cooperative housing, such as quality housing
for minimal expense, do not constitute "profit"; the securities acts were
intended to protect those who invest with the expectation of monetary
profit.207
204. 366 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd
eub nom. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S.Ct. 2051 (1975).
205. Id. at 1126-27.
206. Id. at 1129 n.35. The tax benefit claimed in Forman was in the form of de-
ductions from each shareholder's individual federal income tax under INT. Rav. CODE
oF 1954, § 216, for amounts paid to the housing cooperative to the extent they repre-
sented the shareholder's "proportionate share (based on the total shares outstanding) of
the real estate taxes and mortgage interest allowable as a deduction to the cooperative."
Eckstein v. United States, 452 F.2d 1036, 1038 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Section 216 was de-
signed to place tenant-stockholders of housing cooperatives on the same tax footing as
homeowners, see TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 163, 164; S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942), rather than apartment renters, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
Many commentators have urged that tax benefits be considered "profit." See, e.g.,
Coffey 399; Long 161-62; Zammit, Securities Law Aspects of Cooperative Housing,
N.Y.L.J, Jan. 8, 1973, at 1; Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal
Securities Laws, 71 CoLumt. L. REv. 118 (1971); Note, Cooperative Apartment Housing,
61 HA.v. L. REv. 1407 (1948).
207. 366 F. Supp. at 1130-31. The court quoted extensively from the legislative his.
tory of the Act. See H.R. RFP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1964); H.R. REp,
No. 1382, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
11 (1933); Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 & S. 1642 Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2,
at 855-65 (1963-1964).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/1
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the Forman trial court and
held that shares in the cooperative were "investment contracts. '208
The court reasoned that there were three possible benefits which could
accrue to purchasers. First, the success of the association 0 9 could
mean lower maintenance fees for the tenants. Secondly, the tax
benefits were viewed by the Second Circuit as an incident of securities
ownership, as the court analogized to investment tax shelters for the
rich. Thirdly, the court accepted the argument that the opportunity
to buy quality housing for a lower charge constituted a profit to the
shareholders. 210
Recently, the Supreme Court approved the trial court's view that
participation in the corporation involves neither the sale of "stock"
nor an "investment contract" and therefore, was not subject to the
securities laws.21' Purporting to examine the substance of the trans-
action in light of economic reality, the Court maintained, notwith-
standing the name attached to the interest, that the shares did not
possess the "characteristics traditionally associated with stock .... .. 12
Since the shares were not accompanied by (1) the right to receive divi-
dends out of profits, (2) the potential for appreciation in value, (3)
proportional voting rights, and (4) the right of unrestricted alienability,
the improbability that purchasers desiring residential accommodations
believed they were acquiring securities simply by virtue of a nametag
precluded finding securities.213 In effect, the plaintiffs were unable to
convince the Court that the purchase decisions were motivated by ex-
pectations of profits.
Similarly, the expectation of profits requirement, and particularly the
nature of those profits, proved to be the hurdle that prevented the find-
ing of an "investment contract":
208. 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974).
209. In this case, the association leased its common ground to retail establishments,
and the income from that rent determined the amount of carrying charges to the share-
holders/tenants.
210. The same issue was recently presented to the same two courts in 1050 Tenants
Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afj'd, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir.
1974), in which the district court distinguished its own decision in Forman on the
grounds that the Jakobson cooperative was not a non-profit organization and that the
members had the right to resell their shares for a profit.
211. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S.Ct. 2051 (1975).
212. Id. at 2060.
213. Id.
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By profits, the Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting
from the development of the initial investment ...or a participation
in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds .... "I
The Court then proceeded to analyze the benefits accruing to partici-
pants in the development. First, the trial court's tax benefit analysis
was reiterated. Second, whatever benefits the plaintiffs received by oc-
cupying low-priced, high-value living units were neither dependent
upon the managerial efforts of others nor capable of liquidation into
cash. Finally, whatever income might result from commercial rentals
in the development was "far too speculative and insubstantial to bring
the entire transaction within the Securities Acts. ' 21r The Court felt
the crucial distinction to be between "an investment where one parts
with his money in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of oth-
ers, and where he purchases a commodity for personal consumption or
living quarters for personal use." 1'
While the SEC has taken a somewhat equivocal position on this mat-
ter, 21 a policy analysis without rigid reliance on Howey would indicate
that shares in a housing cooperative constitute a security, notwithstand-
ing the Court's decision in Forman. First, the scheme presents the same
types of abuses that affect other securities offers.21 Secondly, there is
little reason to confine the securities acts to situations in which an actual
monetary return is expected. Certainly, as the Coffey analysis suggests,
there is an expectation of a "valuable benefit" from the enterprise. A
more serious question is whether the securities laws are the appropriate
vehicles of regulation. There are a number of state statutes that purport
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2062.
216. Id. at 2063. The dissent essentially agreed with the circuit court, and disputed
the majority's interpretation of (1) the nature of profits, (2) the de minimus aspect of
commercial rental profits, (3) the nature of the tax benefit, and (4) the importance of
the efforts of others to the success of the development. Id. at 2064-67.
217. SEC rule 235(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.235(a) (1974), may indicate SEC willing-
ness to consider cooperative shares to be securities. The rule exempts from registration,
under certain conditions, "stock or other securities representing membership in any co-
operative housing corporation." See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95
S.Ct. 2051, 2063-64 n. 24 (1975).
218. The major abuses presented in the cooperative area are promoter self-dealing,
misrepresentation, misuse of deposit money before the association election, and threats
of evictions to get votes. See Note, Florida Condominiums-Developer Abuses and Se-
curities Law Implications Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA. L.
REv. 350 (1973).
219. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 711.13, 711.24 (1971); NJ. lRnv. STAT. § 3-27 et seq.
(1970); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw. § 352-e (McKinney 1968, Supp. 1973).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/1
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to regulate the condominium field,2 19 but their inadequacies have been
fully documented.2 " Housing presents intricate problems in real estate
financing and insurance, and may be beyond the competence of securi-
ties examiners. The solution may be a limited exemption from securi-
ties registration, with a continued availability of the securities antifraud
remedies.221
5. Notes: Freedom from Howey
Although the Howey definition of "investment contract" has domi-
nated recent developments in the determination of the meaning of
"security," one area of activity has centered on the language, "any note
...or evidence of indebtedness," in the statutory definitions. After
a false start, the courts have had little difficulty in developing a formula
based on functional realities and policy implications. The false start
was the result of dictum in a Fifth Circuit opinion, Lehigh Valley Trust
Co. v. Central National Bank of Jacksonville.222 The court held that
a share in a loan participation agreement was a security, but added that
almost all notes were securities as well. 2 8
This language apparently formed the basis of holdings in two later
cases. In Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc.2 ' the court held that
promissory notes given in payment for corporate assets were "securi-
ties" under the 1934 Act. The court was concerned that if all "notes"
were securities, the "instruments used in every private loan transaction"
might invoke federal jurisdiction under the securities acts, but felt com-
pelled to follow the plain meaning of the statutory language, "any
note. ' 225  There is some justification for this holding, since the case
220. See Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations, supra note 206; Note, supra note
218, at 358-59.
221. The Second Circuit in Forman specifically rejected a defense that the associa-
tion was regulated by another agency in New York. 500 F.2d at 1256.
222. 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
223. The court did have some precedent for its statement. See, e.g., Prentice v. Hsu,
280 F. Supp. 385, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (promissory note for personal loan held secu-
rity); cf. Olympic Capital Corp. v. Newman, 276 F. Supp. 646, 653 (M.D. Cal. 1967)
(personal note given for loan; neither party questioned whether security involved). But
see SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (notes
of personal loans not securities, without discussion); Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786
(S.D.W. Va. 1954) (personal note not security, without discussion).
224. 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
225. Id. at 808. The court continued,
[O]ur jurisdiction could be invoked with respect to any claim of fraud in con-
nection with the issuance of a check or note, no matter how small the transac-
tion (e.g., the purchase of an automobile or refrigerator), provided the mails
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involved fraud in connection with a sale of corporate assets, a situation
which suggests the application of the securities laws. In MacAndrews
& Forbes Co. v. American Barmag Corp.22 the court held that a bill
of exchange for the purchase of a texturizing machine constituted a se-
curity. A combination of the Tcherepnin "broad reading"22 language
and the canon of strict construction led to the result.
At the same time, two other district courts were taking a contrary
position. In Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc.228 plaintiffs execut-
ed promissory notes to defendant in exchange for lifetime member-
ships in a health club. When ,the club failed, plaintiffs, sued under
rule 1Ob-5. The court, citing the "unless the context otherwise re-
quires" language that precedes the definitional section of the 1934 Act,
held that the securities acts were not intended to cover ordinary con-
sumer transactions.220 The same analysis was applied in McClure v.
First National Bank of Lubbock, Texas.230  The court held that a
promissory note secured by a deed of trust was not a "security" since
the 1934 Act was intended to cover only transactions "in which there
is common trading for speculation or investment, '231 while these loans
were "ordinary commercial loans. 232
A corporate mismanagement case, Rekant v. Desser,233 provided a
key to analyzing the note problem. A stockholder filed a derivative
suit against the corporation's president on the ground that the president
had compelled the corporation to issue a note in exchange for over-
valued farm land that the president owned, in violation of rule lOb-5.
The court, in holding that the note was a "security," stated:
or some other instrumentality of interstate commerce were used. Furthermore,
the maker of the note or check as well as the payee would be entitled to sue.
We do not view this as the type of situation that prompted the enactment of
the federal securities laws.
226. 339 F. Supp. 1401 (D.S.C. 1972).
227. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
228. 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
229. The court relied heavily on City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 290 F. Supp. 592
(W.D. Ark. 1968), affd, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. deniead 399 U.S. 905 (1970),
in which the court held that a bank loan was not a security, but merely a commercial
transaction.
230. 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aftd, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), noted
in 5 TExAs T.ECH. L. REv. 200 (1973).
231. 352 F. Supp. at 457, quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Co., 320 U.S. 344,
350-51 (1943).
232. 352 F. Supp. at 457.
233. 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
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That [the corporation] may have chosen to pay for the land by the issu-
ance of its note as opposed to the issuance of some other form of security
should have no bearing on the coverage of the Rule since the Rule pro-
hibits fraud in connection with the sale of any security. 234
Thus, the court in effect suggested that the finding of a security should
be linked to the function that the note plays in the transaction. The
Rekant analysis was refined in Zeller v. Bogue Electric Manufacturing
Corp.,s35 another lOb-5 derivative suit. The court held that a series
of open-account, no interest loans from a subsidiary to its parent cor-
poration were "securities" when replaced by an interest-beating prom-
issory note. The court cautioned, however:
It does not follow ... that every transaction within the introductory
clause of Section 10, which involves promissory notes, whether of less
or more than nine months maturity, is within Rule 10b-5. The Act is
for the protection of investors, and its provisions must be read accord-
ingly. . . . But we see no reason to doubt that [the subsidiary] stood
in the position of an investor, although perhaps an involuntary one,
with respect to [the parent]. 236
Thus, the key under this analysis is to distinguish between ordinary
commercial loans and investment loans. If notes are issued to obtain
financing, they call for the special protection of the securities acts. If
there is one note issued in the context of a consumer loan, the securi-
ties acts are inappropriate. 3 7  Two recent cases apply this test effec-
tively. In Davis v. Avco Corp.s38 investors' participation in one of
Turner's pyramid schemes was financed through notes. The court held
that this was not an ordinary commercial loan, but rather was part of
a financing operation which "call[ed] into play the antifraud protection
and remedies of the securities laws. 239  In Bellah v. First National
234. Id. at 878 (emphasis original).
235. 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
236. Id. at 800.
237. The Zeller court emphasized this distinction by reasoning that merely because
a note had a maturity of less than nine months-and thus was apparently excluded from
the definition of "security" in § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
(1970)---"did not take the case out of Rule lOb-5, unless the note fits the general notion
of 'commercial paper' reflected in [SEC Securities Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20,
1961)]." Id. See Anderson v. Francis I duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn.
1968); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933); A. BROMBMnG, SncUnrrms
LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE lob-5 § 4.6(317) (1969), cited in Zeller v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir. 1973).
238. 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
239. Id. at 787.
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Bank240 the Fifth Circuit retreated from its Lehigh Valley dicta and
held that an ordinary bank note to secure a debt was only a commercial
loan and did not require the protection of the securities acts. Davis
and Bellah demonstrate an awareness of policy considerations that is
generally absent in the Howey determination. The ordinary consumer
loan situation is covered by the federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 41 while the Uniform Commercial Code is intended to give states
jurisdiction over commercial transactions. There is little reason to
introduce the SEC into the field unless the notes are part of a finance
capital situation with possibilities of fraud in the issuance.242
240. 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974). There is some indication that Con-
gress felt that commercial transactions and securities were two different things. Thus,
Congress delineated transactions outside the purview of the Act. This list included
"credit transactions. . . for business or commercial purposes" and "transactions in secu-
rities." Id. § 1603.
242. Most commentators agree with this test. See, e.g., Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are
(Are Not?) Always Securities-A Review, 29 Bus. LAw. 861 (1974); Comment, Com-
mercial Notes and Definition of "Security" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
A Note is a Note is a Note, 52 Nm. L. Rav. 478 (1973); 5 Tax.As TECH. L. REv. 200
(1973).
One reason the courts have taken a careful look at the note as a security question
is that it has arisen in the context of two other difficult securities questions. First, the
decision often involves a consideration of the rule lob-5 purchaser-seller problem. For
instance, it is difficult to see how a fraudulent defendant "purchases" a "security" when
a plaintiff buys something on time. See Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d
Cir. 1973); Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1971). Secondly,
there is a problem with the short-term note exemption of § 3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act.
See note 237 supra. There is some controversy over whether this exemption was meant
to apply to ordinary commercial situations. See United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d
1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972), noted in 26 VAND. L. Rav. 874
(1973); United States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Conn. 1969). See generally Note,
The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Act, 39 U. Cm. L. Rav. 362 (1972).
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